Contents:

 

Acknowledgement

 

Introduction

 

1. Reporting Belief

1.1. Temporalism and Eternalism

1.2. Truth Conditions

1.3. The Argument from Truth-Values

1.4. The Incompleteness Argument

1.5. Richard’s Objection

1.6. Recent Discussion of Richard’s Objection

1.7. Richard’s Objection Reconsidered

1.8. Belief Retention

1.9. Belief De Se

1.10. Conclusion

 

2. Representing Tense

2.1. King’s Time Analysis

2.2. Higginbotham’s Event Analysis

2.3. The Empirical Evidence against Traditional Tense Logic

2.4. Time Adverbials

2.5. Composite Tense Operators

2.6. Span Operators

2.7. Salmon’s Ellipsis Theory

2.8. Ludlow’s Temporal Anaphora Hypothesis

2.9. King’s Evidence Explained

2.10. Location Operators

2.11. Conclusion

 

3. Eternalism Undermined

3.1. Kaplan’s Argument

3.2. Replies to Kaplan’s Argument

3.3. The Redundancy of the Present Tense

3.4. An Argument against a Quantifier Analysis of the Tenses

3.5. The Argument from Disagreement

3.6. The Argument from Belief Retention

3.7. The Accident

3.8. Conclusion

 

4. Eternal Propositions

4.1. Two Kinds of Content

4.2. Past- and Future-Tensed Sentences

4.3. Two Kinds of Propositions

4.4. Eternal Propositions and the Quantifier Analysis

4.5. Conclusion

 

5. An Alternative Route to Temporalism

5.1. An Alternative Route to Temporalism

5.2. The Open Future

5.3. Double-Time Reference Semantics

5.4. Standard Semantics and Direct Speech Reports

5.5. ‘Actually’

5.6. Other Kinds of Relativisms

5.7. Stanley’s Argument

5.8. Perspectivalism

5.9. Conclusion

 

Conclusion